

THE JAYNESIAN

Newsletter of the Julian Jaynes Society | Summer 2007, Volume 1, Issue 1

EDITORS' CORNER

The launch of an inaugural publication is both an anxious and exciting endeavor. Fortunately, due to the advantages of the digital age, it is more of the latter. And it is with a spirit of curiosity and anticipation that we have initiated the *The Jaynesian*. An e-publication, this newsletter is intended to promote the goals of the Julian Jaynes Society: to foster discussion and a better understanding of the life and work of Julian Jaynes (1920–1997).

Some background is in order. A maverick psychologist who taught at Princeton University, Julian Jaynes is best known for his 1976 book *The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind*. A nominee for the 1978 National Book Award, his work was criticized by some and acclaimed by others as one of the most important books of the 20th century. Relying on archeology, literary studies, linguistics, religious studies, and neurology, Jaynes theorized that conscious interior experience as we now experience it is not a bio-evolutionary adaptation but a relatively recent response to socio-historical forces. The bicameral mind refers to a pre-conscious mentality in which a "god side" commanded the "man side" in the form of hallucinated voices. This two-chambered mentality, evolved to accommodate the agricultural revolution and urbanization, disintegrated under the pressures of demographic expansion and sociopolitical complexity. Though vestiges of bicamerality remain (hypnosis, schizophrenia, spirit possession, glossolalia), it was replaced by a unitary self capable of introspection. In 2006 Marcel Kuijsten, founder of the Julian Jaynes Society, edited a collection of articles that examine and elaborate upon Julian Jaynes's theories. The resulting book was *Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness: Julian Jaynes's Bicameral Mind Theory Revisited*.

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

We hope you visit the Julian Jaynes Society (www.julianjaynes.org) where additional information about Julian Jaynes, his writings, articles by interested scholars, a discussion forum, and ordering details for *Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness* can be found. Membership requires a nominal fee.

If you or anyone you know might be interested in contributing to the *The Jaynesian*, please contact us with your ideas. We also encourage readers to share the *The Jaynesian* with others.

Co-Editors:

Brian J. McVeigh
East Asian Studies Department
University of Arizona
bmcveigh@email.arizona.edu

Marcel Kuijsten
Executive Director, Julian Jaynes Society
kuijsten@julianjaynes.org

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The 2008 Julian Jaynes Conference on Consciousness

The 2008 Julian Jaynes Conference on Consciousness is tentatively scheduled for August 7–9, 2008. The conference is organized and coordinated by Professor Scott Greer at the University of Prince Edward Island (UPEI) Psychology Department and will be held at the UPEI campus.

History of the Conference

The Julian Jaynes Conference on Consciousness was created as part of the Julian Jaynes Memorial Endowment at the University of Prince Edward Island. This fund was established to create a lasting tribute to the late Princeton professor and author, and long-time PEI resident, and to fulfill his legacy to support and encourage the study of consciousness.

Past Events

In October 2002, Professor Greer held the first Julian Jaynes Symposium, which featured Professor William Woodward of the University of New Hampshire, who gave a lecture titled "Julian Jaynes: A Life in Pursuit of the Origin of Consciousness." The following year Daniel Dennett, author and Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University, presented the lecture "Real Consciousness, Real Freedom, Real Magic." In October 2004, Michael Gazzaniga, Professor and Director of the Center for Cognitive Neuroscience at Dartmouth College (now at U.C. Santa Barbara), spoke on "The Brain and Conscious Experience." In September 2005, the symposium was expanded to three lectures, given by John Limber, Professor of Psychology at the University of New Hampshire, Brian McVeigh, Lecturer in Anthropology at the University of Arizona, and Professor Scott Greer.

Conference coordinator Scott Greer (2nd from left) with speakers Jan Sleutels, William Woodward, and Brian McVeigh. (Photo: Marcel Kuijsten)

In 2006, the symposium was moved to the month of August and expanded to a full 2-day conference with 16 speakers and a keynote address by Professor of Neurology and author Dr. Richard Restak. In addition to the lectures and social opportunities, other highlights included the rare privilege of a private tour of the Jaynes family home in PEI and spending time with the Jaynes Collection — Julian Jaynes's personal library which he donated to the university.

If you are interested in presenting a paper at the upcoming conference in 2008, please contact the conference coordinator Scott Greer at sgreer@upei.ca or 902-566-0690. For information on attending this event, see: www.julianjaynes.org/conference.

Julian Jaynes's summer and retirement home in Prince Edward Island. (Photo: Marcel Kuijsten)

Origins: How We Became Human

An educational board game about the beginnings of humanity

Phil Eklund

This is to announce that our project, a family board game about the Origins of Mankind, should be on the market by this fall. This is surely the first ever attempt to present the ideas of Julian Jaynes in a game about the origins of humanity. This board game, called "Origins, How We Became Human" is currently in play-test mode.

The struggle for animals to become human went through several stages, each of which came close to extinguishing the experiment altogether. Game cards represent four such stages, starting with hunter-gatherers of 120,000 years ago, and ending yesterday in a sweep that encompasses everything from Neanderthals to Coca-Cola.



For the 100,000 years that marked the first such stage, mankind's progress was hardly perceptible. They knapped hand axes with great skill, but it was a learned skill accomplished without the benefit of a mental image of the finished product, and as a consequence lithic technology stagnated throughout the Pleistocene. Instincts were rigidly compartmentalized; instincts and behaviours governing the shaping of stone could not be applied to the shaping of bone or antler, for instance. Mankind faced the Ice Age without composite tooling, fire, clothing, fishing, projectiles, shelters, art, religions, rituals, or burial goods. But presumably they were using their modern-sized brains to build up a repertoire of communication signals, favored by female selection (who still today express their preference for witty and loquacious males).

The second such stage in the game is heralded by the introduction of those mental units called words. A word is a communication that can be stored in memory in a versatile verbal format, which allows learning in one arena to be metaphorically applied to other areas. This event, what Jaynes calls the Age of Names, occurred some 30,000 years ago. As suddenly as a light switch being turned on, people were leaving grave goods, making idols, painting cave walls, the full gamut of bicameral authorizations.

Preconscious men communicated to themselves and others with spoken and then written words, and recalled images from memory reconstructed from verbal format. The third stage in the game is ushered in by the breakdown of the bicameral mind itself. Man searches for lost authorizations in the Age of Faith, and later (the fourth era) the Age of Reason. Each new stage plunges the players into a dark age, as the outmoded means of authorization collapse. To determine the winner, players receive victory points based on the administrative, technological, cultural, and demographic aspects of their civilizations through time.

"Origins" will be published in October of 2007 in Germany by Sphinxspiele Verlag and in the United States by Sierra Madre Games. It comes with maps of the New and Old Worlds, 120 markers, demography sheets, and 110 playing cards. For more information, please see www.SierraMadreGames.com.

BOOK REVIEWS

Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness: Julian Jaynes's Bicameral Mind Theory Revisited

Marcel Kuijsten (Ed.)
Julian Jaynes Society, Jan. 2007
446 pgs., ISBN 978-0-9790744-0-0



Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness is now available from the Julian Jaynes Society, Barnes and Noble.com, Amazon.com, and select bookstores in the U.S. and Europe.

For three decades I have been enthralled by the ideas put forth by Julian Jaynes in his *The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind* and have been waiting in vain (until now) for a follow-up volume. Jaynes's own planned continuation, *The Consequences of Consciousness*, never materialized; but at last we have *Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness*, a collection of incisive essays by Julian Jaynes himself and by others, commenting upon and extending his previously published work, together with considerable biographical information on the man, edited by Marcel Kuijsten and published by the Julian Jaynes Society.

Even after thirty years I cannot say that I feel that I have completely accepted (perhaps because I still do not fully understand) all aspects of Jaynes's theories about the eruption of consciousness just a few millennia ago, but I do know that *The Origin of Consciousness* is one of the most truly thought-provoking books of the 20th century, and at the very least Julian Jaynes presented a very strong case for the reality of the bicameral mind and its role in auditory hallucinations which were interpreted as the voices of gods in ancient times (and as a recent reading of the Stanley Lombardo translations of *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey* once again proved to me, Jaynes's book provides a brilliantly illuminated perspective upon the Homeric epic poems). Kuijsten's new book powerfully reinforces these concept, partly through the inclusion of new material from Jaynes on Egypt and China, but there are also important essays from other scholars in the new book such as John Limber's "Language and Consciousness" and Jan Sleutels's "Greek Zombies," just to name two of them.

Although *Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness* could be read independently (or even serve as an introduction to Jaynes's earlier work), it will unquestionably be most appreciated by those thoroughly familiar with Jaynes's original book. This new volume is intensely stimulating and beyond doubt imagination-stretching.

Bruce Trinque
Amston, CT

ESSAYS

The Origin of Rhetoric in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind

Ted Remington

The concept of rhetoric does not appear in Julian Jaynes's *The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind*. Nor does Jaynes's work figure prominently in works of rhetorical theory and criticism.

This is unfortunate. Jaynes's ideas on the role of language in constructing consciousness have much to say to scholars of rhetoric, and the field of rhetoric offers a venue in which we can see the applicability of Jaynes's ideas in our daily lives.

It is also surprising. Jaynes's idea of mind-space as a metaphorical construct offers scholars of rhetoric, who devote themselves in large measure to the study of figurative language, an open invitation to explore the connections between the development of consciousness and the art of rhetoric. And rhetoric, as the study of public address, seems a fruitful area to which to apply the work of a man who writes, "To hear is, in a certain sense, to obey."

This essay has two purposes. The first is to briefly suggest what Jaynes's ideas about consciousness imply for the origin of rhetoric in ancient Greece. The second is to offer a glimpse of how not only Jaynes's works, but that of other scholars who examine the relationships among the biology of the brain, language, and consciousness, can shed light on the field of rhetoric.

This latter point is especially important. Rhetorical studies have drawn heavily on works of philosophy, from Plato to Foucault, to help explain how and why discourse affects beliefs and moves people to action. Yet, comparatively little has been done to incorporate the ideas of thinkers like Jaynes, and psychologists whose work bridges the gap between the biology of the brain and the social use of language. Yet, if the study of rhetoric is the study of how language shapes our perceptions of the world, wouldn't it be useful for scholars in the field to look at the interaction between language and mind at its most tactical level: the way in which it acts upon the individual's consciousness?

The Question of Rhetoric's Origin

Richard Leo Enos, a leading historian of the art of rhetoric, notes in the preface to his book *Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle* (1993) that conventional wisdom suggests that rhetoric as an art developed during the fifth century BCE at the earliest, and possibly much later. He argues convincingly, however, that pinpointing a moment at which rhetoric emerges in Greek thought is difficult, and probably impossible, given the gradual development of most complex intellectual concepts.

In fact, Enos writes, we see evidence of the connection between thought and the ways in which it is expressed through language as far back as the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Quoting several passages from both works, Enos says that Homer's epics show an awareness of the "power to discover and contrive through words."

A reader familiar with Jaynes's work, while not disagreeing with the idea that rhetoric predates its typical dating to the fifth century BCE, will immediately raise questions about Enos's conclusions. Specifically, there are two things problematic about Enos's use of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* as evidence of a sophisticated understanding of the relationship between discourse and thought in the Greek mind. First, Enos quotes more often from the *Odyssey* than the *Iliad*, but treats them as equivalent texts for the purposes of dating an awareness of rhetorical dimensions of language. But as Jaynes notes, the two poems present very different views of the mental worlds of their protagonists. While still tied to a bicameral mentality, the *Odyssey* offers glimpses of its disintegration (or perhaps integration), a quality that is consistent with the generally accepted notion that its composition came after that of the *Iliad*.

Second, many of Enos's quotations from the *Iliad* come from sections of the poem that may be much later additions — during or after the eroding of bicameral mentality. Without putting enough emphasis on the differences between the poems in terms of both content and the details of their textual histories, Enos makes assumptions that are problematic, particularly if we grant even the most basic of Jaynes's ideas about Greek consciousness as represented by Homer.

In what follows, I offer a sketch of what an acceptance of Jaynes's ideas about consciousness does suggest about the development of rhetoric.

Rhetoric and the Emergence of Consciousness

Aristotle defined rhetoric as the study of "the available means of persuasion in a given situation." Persuasion, in any true sense of the term, could not exist without the type of consciousness Jaynes describes as only developing toward the end of the second millennium BCE. One cannot persuade without the ability to see the world from the point of view of the one to be persuaded. Only by imaginatively inhabiting the mind-space of the other can persuasion be effected.

Rhetoric also relies on a conception of time that, according to Jaynes, is only possible after the development of consciousness. Returning to Aristotle's description of the art, rhetoric falls into three general categories: deliberative (discussion of what to do in the future), judicial (discussion of what happened in the past), and epideictic (discussion of what or who is praiseworthy). Without a narrative sense of time, the first two modes of rhetoric are clearly impossible, and the third becomes problematic (praise relying on the evaluation of past actions with respect to what qualities lead to desired outcomes).

Traditionally, the development of consciousness and the advent of rhetoric have not been linked. Consciousness is assumed to have emerged in the distant past of human evolution, while rhetoric is considered an effect of a much more recent series of philosophical and political developments in ancient Greece. But if we entertain Jaynes's ideas about the much later development of consciousness, a different story of rhetoric's origins emerges. Consciousness and rhetoric not only develop at roughly the same place and time, but they are inextricably linked, since what Jaynes describes as the hallmarks of consciousness — imagining the mind-space of another, reflecting on the consequences of actions, understanding time as a narrative, using language to intentionally shape the perceptions of others (including lying) — are also the prerequisites for rhetoric.

In short, rhetoric is what we are left with when the gods have abandoned us. Once the disembodied voices of kings and deities stopped telling us what to do and say, it fell to us to make decisions for ourselves. We needed to self-consciously use language to build and maintain social relationships. We needed to tell one another (and ourselves) what to do. We needed to become rhetorical beings.

Such an understanding stands the traditional description of the relationship between rhetoric and the broader philosophical developments of ancient Greece on its head. Rather than a tool that developed to negotiate the emerging political and philosophical realities of Greek life, it was rhetoric that provided the tool needed to create these new political and philosophical realities.

More traditional conceptions of consciousness, locating its development much further in the past than Jaynes does, call for strictly social or intellectual explanations for the flourishing of Greek culture from the time of Solon onward. This leads, understandably, to the presumption that social changes (e.g., the move toward democracy) were prerequisites to the emergence of rhetoric. The concept and emerging practice of democratic politics called for a tool with which such social relations could be practiced. Therefore, rhetoric developed from a social need for it.

Jaynes's narrative of the origin of consciousness, however, implicitly casts rhetoric in a different role. Given the time frame Jaynes suggests for the emergence of consciousness, as well as the central role of how language serves as a source of social cohesiveness in Jaynes's concept of both bicameral and

fully conscious cultures, rhetoric becomes the more primal concept. It is the prerequisite for the development of law, philosophical abstractions, and democracy, since each of these requires a fully conscious mind to comprehend them. Such a mind does not take direction from disembodied voices, but is capable of introspection and of choosing words with which to represent and share its mind-space. In other words, these aforementioned concepts require rhetoric.

Rhetoric, therefore, is epistemic on the deepest of levels. It does not simply produce knowledge, but it produces the very ability to have knowledge in the first place. Having the capability to communicate an idea is a prerequisite for having the idea to begin with.

The Dangers and Art of Rhetoric

A Jaynesian understanding of consciousness and its implications for rhetoric also helps explain the deep distrust of rhetoric that emerges at the same time rhetoric itself does. From the first writings overtly discussing persuasion as a civic art, we also see attacks on rhetoric as a practice that disregards the truth, can make what is bad seem good, and has an uncanny power to enrapture an audience.

One of the best examples of this sort of skepticism is in Plato's dialog *The Menexenus*, in which Socrates describes the effects of hearing a speech praising the virtues of Athens. Although he knows that much of what the speaker says is exaggeration and distortion, Socrates says he felt himself transported to another realm — an "out of body" experience that affects his very perception of the world around him.

The usual understanding of this sort of allegation about rhetoric's spellbinding power over an audience is that it is simply a poetic description of the sensation that we all experience today: the ability of powerful words to move us in unexpected ways, ways that often go beyond the logical or didactic. But I suggest that if Jaynes is right about the time frame for the development of consciousness, such descriptions by rhetoric's critics may be less poetic than usually thought, and much closer to the actual experience of early audiences of the relatively new art of rhetoric.

If full consciousness in Greece emerged only after the Homeric era, would we not expect that for several generations after its advent, the power of language would indeed seem mysterious, almost mystical? Wouldn't there continue to be a collective social memory of language as something that came from the gods? I suggest that the early apprehension about rhetoric's near magical powers are not simply metaphorical amplifications, but descriptions of how audiences, only lately emerging from a bicameral world, would have experienced hearing an orator with the ability to artfully use language to move them.

At the same time, putting the development of rhetoric in the context of the breakdown of the bicameral mind also suggests why rhetoric is an art — one that requires significant study to practice successfully (and necessitates handbooks on it, such as Aristotle's). If the development of consciousness allows rhetoricians to put themselves in the mind-space of their intended audience in order to anticipate what arguments will most likely persuade them, it also allows audiences to put themselves in the mind-space of the rhetorician. No longer is language a simple and irresistible goad to action. Obedience does not automatically follow because the speaker has a higher social standing than his audience. Listeners can think about why speakers say what they do, reflect on how the words are affecting them, compare the truth claims made by the speaker to their own perceptions of the world, and question not only the motivations of speakers, but their own initial reactions to the words they hear.

Rather than a simple means of creating direct orders, language in general, and public discourse specifically, becomes a negotiation among beings, each with their own mind-space and sense of self, to create an area of overlapping senses of reality and motivation. This is a much trickier business than the bicameral leader had, who simply took verbal dictation from his gods and passed these words onto others, who in turn accepted these words as unquestionable prompts to action.

Conclusion

I have done little more than offer the briefest sketch of what Jaynes's ideas about the bicameral mind suggest about the development of rhetoric. A closer study of important texts in the development of rhetoric in the context of the narrative of the breakdown of the bicameral mind is necessary to make truly persuasive arguments about what Jaynes's ideas about consciousness say about rhetoric. I hope, however, that even this brief essay offers reasons to believe such studies would be fruitful for scholars of rhetoric as well as for those interested in exploring the evidence for, and import of, a Jaynesian understanding of consciousness.

Moving beyond questions about when, how, and why the art of rhetoric developed in ancient Greece, Jaynes's ideas suggest interesting ways of understanding how language works as a persuasive, motivating social force today. In particular, they offer evidence of the inextricable links between psychological studies of how language structures our very thought processes and rhetorical studies of how we use language to create and maintain a shared social reality. And they make the provocative assertion that when we talk amongst ourselves, we produce echoes of the voices of the gods.

Ted Remington is Assistant Professor of English and Director of Writing at the University of Saint Francis in Fort Wayne, Indiana. He holds a Ph.D. in Rhetorical Studies from the University of Iowa. E-mail: treming930@hotmail.com

Chinese Pictograms and the Bicameral Mind

Masanori Ishimori and Takashi X. Fujisawa

As is well known to our readers, Jaynes (1976, 1990) put forward a preposterous and distinctive hypothesis concerning the human mind: until around 1,000 BC human nature was split in two, one an "executive" god part, the other a "follower" man part. Neither part was conscious.

According to Jaynes, Iliadic man did not have subjectivity as we do; he had no awareness of his awareness of the world, no internal mind-space to introspect upon. In the Mycenaean mind, planning and initiative took place with no conscious input whatever, and the results were then 'told' to the individual in his everyday language: sometimes accompanied by the visual aura of a familiar friend, an authority figure, or a "god," and sometimes as a voice alone. The individual obeyed these hallucinated voices because he could not "see" what to do by himself.

Jaynes calls this ancient mind the "bicameral" mind. During the time of the bicameral mind, it is assumed that the stress-threshold above which hallucinations could be triggered was much lower than in normal people, or even the schizophrenics, of today. The only stress necessary was that which occurred when a change in behavior became necessary because of some novel situation.

Both left and right hemispheres of the human brain are able to understand language, while normally only the left can produce speech. However, there is some vestigial functioning of the right-hemisphere Wernicke's area which could explain the 'voices of the gods'. If the two hemispheres under certain conditions are able to act almost as independent persons, their relationship would correspond to that of the man-god relationships of bicameral times.

Jaynes uses the term "preconscious hypostases" (Greek, "standing under") for the bodily sensations that would later evolve into individual consciousness. The preconscious hypostases are the assumed causes of action when no other causes are apparent. They are the seats of reaction and responsibility found during the transition from the bicameral mind to subjective consciousness. The frequency and the meaning of the terms denoting these sensations gradually changed from text to text from about 850 to 600 BC, until in the sixth century BC their referents joined together in what we would call the subjective conscious mind. Extrapolating from these changes, Jaynes roughly divides the temporal development of the preconscious hypostases into four phases:

Phase I: *Objective*: simple external observations;
Phase II: *Internal*: things inside the body, particularly certain internal sensations;
Phase III: *Subjective*: processes that we would call mental; internal spaces where metaphorical actions may occur;
Phase IV: *Synthetic*: the various hypostases unite into one conscious self capable of introspection.

However, Walter Ong (1982) suggests that if we viewed this historical change in terms of the transition from "orality" to "literacy," a simpler and more verifiable account could be obtained.

Jaynes summarized how individuals functioned in ancient society using four aspects of the general bicameral paradigm: (1) the *collective cognitive imperative*, or belief system, a culturally agreed-on expectancy or prescription which defines the particular form of a phenomenon and the roles to be acted out within that form; (2) an *induction* or formally ritualized procedure whose function is the narrowing of consciousness by focusing attention on a small range of preoccupations; (3) the *trance*, a response to both of the preceding, characterized by a lessening or loss of consciousness, and the diminishing of the analog 'I', or its loss, resulting in a role that is accepted, tolerated, or encouraged by the group; and (4) the *archaic authorization* to which the trance is directed or related, usually a god but sometimes a person who is accepted by the individual and his culture as an authority-figure, and who by the collective cognitive imperative is held to be responsible for controlling the trance state.

Jaynes also sketches out several factors at work in the transition from the bicameral mind to conscious mind: (1) the weakening of the auditory by the advent of writing; (2) the inherent fragility of hallucinatory control; (3) the unworkableness of gods in the chaos of historical upheaval; (4) the positing of internal causes in the observation of difference in others; (5) the acquisition of narratization from epics; (6) the survival value of deceit; and (7) a modicum of natural selection. He also points out that the importance of writing in the breakdown of the bicameral voices is tremendously important.

Shirakawa (2002), speaking about ancient inscriptions on oracle-bones and tortoise-shells, suggests that pictographic writing originated in the way gods communicated with kings during the theocracy period. The king had to demonstrate divine sanction for his rule by means of written characters.

The amalgamation of different ethnic and cultural groups into one nation makes it necessary to establish a common language, or at least a common form of communication. Chinese pictograms proved to be the ideal means for ensuring that the king's edicts were understood wherever they were read, while also supporting the idea that the king's words were the "voice of god." Moreover, as the use of pictograms to represent ideas strengthened the association between external and internal mental space, subjective consciousness may have grown while the bicameral mind may have weakened.

Jaynes bases his bicameral-mind hypothesis mainly on archaeological findings from various cultures, as well as ancient Greek epic poetry. In his book his only

reference to China was to the Neolithic burials of the Yang-Shao culture, from which he concludes that Chinese literature jumped into the world of subjectivity at the time of *The Analects* of Confucius (551–479 BC), there having been nothing before it. He admitted that "Since I do not know Chinese, I could not address that part of the data in the book."

According to Shirakawa, however, Confucius said in *The Analects* that "When I was young, I was humble and menial. Thus I became very good at doing worthless things." This indicates that Confucians were traditionally located in a social class which made a profession of religious rituals. Nowadays, we regard Confucianism as a moral code which embodies righteousness: this conception came about through the process of its becoming the Chinese state religion, its continued authority depending on the concealment of its origins. Shirakawa also points out that at ritual events Confucius did not merely read traditional poetry, but recited *in a resonant voice* to the accompaniment of traditional musicians. The figure of Confucius would seem to evoke the image of Homer.

To the best of our knowledge, Michael Carr (1985) is the first person to point out the relationship between Chinese pictograms and the bicameral mind. By examining the relation between the structure of the Chinese radical '尸', meaning 'corpse', and the cult of ancestor worship in ancient China, he supposes that the personalized 'living dead' might function as the voice of god. But he did not go into more detail.

Chinese characters were originally hieroglyphic. They were composed of elements which represent objects in the sensual world. Shirakawa explains the Chinese radical '音', meaning 'sound', as originally comprising the elements '㠯' which represents a vessel to contain an invocation of the gods, and '言', a divine revelation issuing from it. The structure of the character indicates that a divine revelation or oracle takes the form of sounds. And the element '㠯' is a key point in his theory.

Shirakawa also explains the Chinese character '聖', which means a sacred person, as depicting a person with a big ear '耳' by the side of a vessel '㠯' which contains an invocation of the gods. It might suggest that a sacred person is seen as someone with a special ability to hear the voice of a god.

As can be seen from these examples, an exploration of the origins of the Chinese writing system could lead us back to bicameral times: it could be a method for pursuing an investigation into the structure of the ancient human mind.

Masanori Ishimori is currently an Associate Professor at Faculty of Human Relations, Kyoto Koka Women's University in Japan.
E-mail: ishimori@mail.koka.ac.jp

Takashi X. Fujisawa received Ph.D. degrees from the Graduate School of Informatics, Kansai University in Japan, in 2004. He is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Research Center for Human Media, Kwansei Gakuin University in Japan.
E-mail: fujisawa@ksc.kwansei.ac.jp

Please send items for *The Jaynesian*, including announcements, book reviews, essays, and other items of interest, to Brian McVeigh (bmcveigh@email.arizona.edu) or Marcel Kuijsten (kuijsten@julianjaynes.org).