

# Reasoning by a Bipolar Argumentation Framework for PROLEG

Tatsuki Kawasaki, Sosuke Moriguchi, and Kazuko Takahashi

School of Science&Technology, Kwansai Gakuin University,  
2-1, Gakuen, Sanda, 669-1337, JAPAN  
dxk96093@kwansai.ac.jp, chiguri@acm.org, ktaka@kwansai.ac.jp

**Abstract.** We develop a system allowing lawyers and law school students to analyze court judgments. We describe a transformation from the logic programming language PROLEG to a bipolar argumentation framework (BAF) and the legal reasoning involved. Legal knowledge written in a PROLEG program is transformed into a BAF, in which the structure of argumentation in a judgment is clear. We describe two types of reasoning by the BAF: clarification of the entire structure and causality of arguments, and identification of the required evidence, and we show its applications on legal reasoning.

**Keywords:** bipolar argumentation framework, PROLEG, reasoning, semantics

## 1 Introduction

Recently, information technology and artificial intelligence are vigorously applied in various fields, including those that have not yet been fully digitized or automated. In the context of legal reasoning, although the use of artificial intelligence has attracted a great deal of attention, higher-level and more practical support exploiting recent technological developments is required. A support for a judgment process is one of the most necessary ones. When seeking to support a judgment, it is essential to develop a system that can be easily used by lawyers who are not computer scientists; also, the system must be highly reliable and must reason accurately and rapidly. Firstly, lawyers must be able to access the system in a straightforward manner, and secondly, the system must describe both the process leading to judgment and the way in which the law was applied.

In terms of the former consideration, as law is supposed to be logical, it is reasonable to base the system on such logic and reason from that perspective. Several legal reasoning systems have adopted logic programming such as Prolog as their descriptive languages. However, it is difficult for a lawyer who is not familiar with computer science to directly write Prolog code. A PROLEG system was developed to solve this problem [17]. It was designed to support inferences based on the Japanese Presupposed Ultimate Facts Theory (termed “Yoken-jijitsu-ron” in Japanese) of the Japanese civil code, and it is currently applied to the Japanese penal code. The theory deals with uncertainties that

sometimes arise in court, where a judge must give a decision even if evidence is lacking. PROLEG is a system to reason about the theory by a Prolog-based meta-interpreter. Each presupposed ultimate fact is represented using general rules written in the form of *if-then* statements and exceptions. Exceptions of fact apply to all general rules and are used as court defenses. The use of exceptions rather than negative atoms creates a structure equivalent to that of a law, allowing lawyers to intuitively understand the program. A burden-of-proof [14] is attached to each ultimate fact to allow for decision-making even if the fact is not proven to be true. This is achieved using the negation-as-failure inference of Prolog; thus, for a given goal, a general rule is applied and the goal is true unless there is an exception.

On the other hand, in terms of legal process and application, it is appropriate to employ argumentation to describe both the judgment process and how the law was applied [1]. An argumentation system reveals both the causality in arguments (for example, how arguments interacted to create a judgment) and the influence of evidence. Argumentation is a powerful tool when used to resolve conflicts, not only formalizing the structure of the process but also incorporating any uncertainties.

In the time since Dung proposed the abstract Argumentation Framework (AF) [9], many extensions and revisions of the system have been published [15]. AF represents an argumentation by a pair of a set of arguments and a set of attacks between arguments, ignoring the contents of arguments. Several AF semantics have been defined; acceptable arguments are calculated based on these semantics. Visualization tools appropriate for argumentation systems have also been developed (e.g., [16]).

Although PROLEG facilitates the representation of a law, it is difficult to grasp the judgment process or a causal relation found in arguments from the execution trace. On the other hand, although it is possible to create an AF representing the interaction between a plaintiff and a defendant in court, it is difficult to directly write the structure of a law per se, or the part of the law used to create an argument in an AF form. Therefore, we combined the two systems.

We developed a transformation from PROLEG to a bipolar argumentation framework (BAF) [6], an extended AF, and showed its correctness [11]. More specifically, we gave a semantics for the BAF obtained as a result of the transformation, and proved that the answer set of the PROLEG program was the same as the set of acceptable arguments in BAF. However, we have not yet discussed what kind of reasoning we can do using this BAF. The objective of this paper is to show how reasoning which is difficult to emulate or understand using a PROLEG program proceeds using the BAF.

Consider the following PROLEG program representing the penal code that defines the “crime of murder.”<sup>1</sup> The first clause indicates the general rule and the second clause an exception. The text states that if the object is a human (not a dead body) and there exists both the action of murder and the intention to

---

<sup>1</sup> Note that the examples shown here are simplified versions of the actual penal code; the conditions per se are simplified and the legal terminology is not precise.

murder, then the crime of murder has been committed unless there is a legitimate defense.

```
crime_of_murder <= human, action_of_murder, intention_to_murder.  
exception(crime_of_murder, legitimate_defense).
```

When evidence is provided, the facts on which that evidence bears are proved, and it is then decided whether the `crime_of_murder` has been committed or not.

A judge should explain the judgment process to persuade those concerned with the transparency of justice. In such a legal situation, what is required is not only the outcome of judicial reasoning but also an explanation of the reasoning process or the cause-and-effect relationships of arguments used in reasoning. For example, if the `crime_of_murder` was adjudged to not in fact have been committed; this may be because of a lack of evidence of `intention_to_murder`, or because a `legitimate_defense` was available.

Our transformed BAF not only shows the process and structure of judgment, but also suggests a strategy by which a user can achieve a desired goal. If a plaintiff/defendant wishes to argue that a law should or should not be applied, the BAF identifies the evidence that must be presented and any counter-arguments that may arise. For example, when a prosecutor wishes to charge the `crime_of_murder`, but finds that the lack of `intention_to_murder` is a complicating factor, s/he will look harder for evidence of `intention_to_murder`. Here, we discuss such reasoning on our BAF.

This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly explain PROLEG. In Section 3, we describe the BAF that we use and its semantics. In Section 4, we describe the transformation rule from PROLEG to the BAF. In Section 5, we describe how the reasoning by the BAF proceeds, and in Section 6, we show its application. In Section 7, we compare our method with those of others. Finally, in Section 8, we offer conclusions and describe our planned future work.

## 2 Legal Description Language: PROLEG

The PROLEG program  $P$  is defined as a pair  $\langle \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{E} \rangle$ , where  $\mathcal{R}$  is a finite set of rules, and  $\mathcal{E}$  is a finite set of exceptions. Each rule is a Horn clause of the form  $H \Leftarrow B_1, \dots, B_n$ , where  $H, B_1, \dots, B_n$  are atoms. Here,  $n$  may be 0, and in this case we term such a rule a *fact rule* or simply a *fact*; when  $n > 0$ , we call the rule a *defining rule*, to distinguish from a fact rule. Each exception is in the form  $\text{exception}(H, B)$ .

A fact is something given as an evidence in a court case, whereas defining rules and exceptions describe the general case. That is, the facts are generally given in an instantiated form whereas defining rules and exceptions include variables. In the following examples, we use a proposition for simplicity.

For each rule  $R$  or exception  $E$ , we employ the functions *head* and *body* such that  $\text{head}(R) = H$  and  $\text{body}(R) = \{B_1, \dots, B_n\}$  if  $R = H \Leftarrow B_1, \dots, B_n$ ;  $\text{head}(E) = H$  and  $\text{body}(E) = \{B\}$  if  $E = \text{exception}(H, B)$ .

An atom may have more than one defining rule. This means that there may exist distinct  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  such that  $head(R_1) = head(R_2)$ .

*Example 1.* The following is an example of a PROLEG program.

```
p <= q1, q2.
exception(q1, r).
q2 <=.
r <=.
```

The semantics of the PROLEG program  $P$  is defined as an answer set (a set of ground atoms).  $M$  is the *answer set* of  $P$  iff  $M$  is the minimum model of the set of Horn clauses,  $\{R \in \mathcal{R} \mid \forall E \in \mathcal{E}, \text{ if } head(E) = head(R) \text{ then } body(E) \not\subseteq M\}$ . The expressive power of PROLEG is the same as that of a normal logic program with an answer set [10, 18].

PROLEG allows cyclic definitions. However, here, we deal with an acyclic PROLEG program, because the Japanese civil and penal codes are usually written in an acyclic manner.

### 3 Bipolar Argumentation Framework

First, we define an argumentation framework [9].

**Definition 1 (argumentation framework).** An argumentation framework is defined as a pair  $\langle AR, AT \rangle$  where  $AR$  is a set of arguments and  $AT$  is a binary relation on  $AR$ , termed an attack. If  $(A, A') \in AT$ , we state that  $A$  attacks  $A'$ .

A BAF is an extension of an AF in which the two relations of attack and support are defined over a set of arguments [6]. We define a support relation between a power set of arguments and a set of arguments; this differs from the usual BAF, because the body of a defining rule generally includes more than one atom in PROLEG.

**Definition 2 (bipolar argumentation framework).** A BAF is defined as a triple  $\langle AR, ATT, SUP \rangle$  where  $AR$  is a finite set of arguments,  $ATT \subseteq AR \times AR$  and  $SUP \subseteq (2^{AR} \setminus \{\emptyset\}) \times AR$ . We denote  $att(B, A)$  if  $(B, A) \in ATT$ , and  $sup(\mathbf{A}, A)$  if  $(\mathbf{A}, A) \in SUP$ .

*Example 2.* Figure 1 is a graphical representation of a bipolar argumentation framework  $\langle \{a, b, c, d, e\}, \{(b, a), (e, d)\}, \{(\{c, d\}, a)\}$ . In the figure, the straight arrow indicates an attack relation and the wavy arrow a support relation.

We gave a semantics for the BAF based on labeling [5]. Usually, labeling is a function from a set of arguments to  $\{in, out, undec\}$ , but *undec* is unnecessary here, because the BAF is acyclic. An argument labeled *in* is considered to be an accepted argument.

**Definition 3 (labeling).** For  $\langle AR, ATT, SUP \rangle$ , a labeling  $\mathcal{L}$  is a function from  $AR$  to  $\{in, out\}$ .




Fig. 1. Example of BAF.

Labeling of a set of arguments is denoted as follows:  $\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{A}) = in$  if  $\mathcal{L}(A) = in$  for all  $A \in \mathbf{A}$ ;  $\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{A}) = out$ , otherwise.

We assign the label *in* to an argument that is neither attacked nor supported by any other argument. When an argument is both attacked and supported, the attack is supposed to be stronger than the support. We assign a label *out* to an argument that is attacked by another argument with the label *out*, and simultaneously supported by a set of arguments with the label *out*. Note that an argument lacking support is labeled *out*, even if it is attacked by an argument labeled *out*.

**Definition 4 (complete labeling).** For  $\langle AR, ATT, SUP \rangle$ , labeling  $\mathcal{L}$  is complete iff the following conditions are satisfied for any argument  $A \in AR$ .

- $\mathcal{L}(A) = in$  if
  - $(\forall B \in AR, \neg att(B, A)) \wedge (\forall \mathbf{A} \subseteq AR, \neg sup(\mathbf{A}, A))$
  - or
  - $(\forall B \in AR, att(B, A) \Rightarrow \mathcal{L}(B) = out) \wedge (\exists \mathbf{A} \subseteq AR, sup(\mathbf{A}, A) \wedge \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{A}) = in)$ .
- $\mathcal{L}(A) = out$ , otherwise.

Figure 2 shows the complete labeling of four BAFs.




Fig. 2. Examples of complete labeling.

*Example 3.* For a BAF in Figure 1,  $\mathcal{L}(b) = \mathcal{L}(c) = \mathcal{L}(e) = in$  and  $\mathcal{L}(a) = \mathcal{L}(d) = \mathcal{L}(\{c, d\}) = out$ .

The following theorem holds [11].


**Theorem 1.** *For any acyclic BAF, there is exactly one complete labeling.*

Note that we distinguish the case in which an argument is supported by a set of arguments from that in which it is supported by multiple arguments separately.

*Example 4.* Consider two BAFs  $baf_1$  and  $baf_2$  shown in Figure 3. Formally,  $baf_1$  is represented as  $\langle \{a, b, c, d\}, \{(d, c)\}, \{(\{b, c\}, a)\} \rangle$  and  $baf_2$  is represented as  $\langle \{a, b, c, d\}, \{(d, c)\}, \{(\{b\}, a), (\{c\}, a)\} \rangle$ .

In  $baf_1$ , the argument  $a$  has one support that is a set of two arguments, whereas in  $baf_2$ , it has two supports, both of which are singletons.

Let  $\mathcal{L}_1$  and  $\mathcal{L}_2$  be the complete labeling of  $baf_1$  and  $baf_2$ , respectively. In  $baf_1$ ,  $\mathcal{L}_1(b) = \mathcal{L}_1(d) = in$  and  $\mathcal{L}_1(c) = out$  hold. It follows that  $\mathcal{L}_1(\{b, c\}) = out$  holds. Therefore,  $\mathcal{L}_1(a) = out$ . On the other hand, in  $baf_2$ ,  $\mathcal{L}_2(b) = \mathcal{L}_2(d) = in$  and  $\mathcal{L}_2(c) = out$  hold similarly. However,  $\mathcal{L}_2(\{b\}) = in$  and  $\mathcal{L}_2(\{c\}) = out$ . Therefore,  $\mathcal{L}_2(a) = in$ .



**Fig. 3.** Two types of support.

## 4 Transformation

### 4.1 Transformation rule

We show a transformation from a PROLEG program to a BAF. The atoms, rules, and exceptions of the PROLEG program are transformed into arguments, supports, and attacks, respectively.

We add two types of arguments to the BAF that do not appear as explicit atoms in PROLEG. One is an argument reflecting the *absence* of any rules of inference in PROLEG. In PROLEG, an atom  $H$  that does not appear in the header of any rule or exception is not in the answer set. On the other hand, arguments that are neither attacked nor supported are labeled *in*. To fill this gap, we add the argument  $ab(H)$  that attacks  $H$ . We term this argument *an absence*

*argument*. We also add arguments showing the *existence* of fact rules. For a fact rule (i.e., a rule in the form  $H \Leftarrow$ ), there are no arguments that support  $H$  in BAF; any support is a binary relation. Therefore, we add an argument  $\text{ex}(H)$  that supports  $H$ . We term this argument an *existence argument*.

**Definition 5 (transformation rule).**

Transformation from a PROLEG program  $\langle \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{E} \rangle$  to a BAF  $\langle AR, ATT, SUP \rangle$  is defined as follows.

- $Atom = \bigcup_{R \in \mathcal{R}} (\{head(R)\} \cup body(R)) \cup \bigcup_{E \in \mathcal{E}} (\{head(E)\} \cup body(E))$
- $Rule = \{(body(R), head(R)) \mid R \in \mathcal{R} \wedge body(R) \neq \emptyset\}$
- $Exc = \{(B, H) \mid \text{exception}(H, B) \in \mathcal{E}\}$
- $Existence = \{H \mid H \Leftarrow \in \mathcal{R}\}$
- $ExistenceSupport = \{(\{\text{ex}(H)\}, H) \mid H \in Existence\}$
- $Absence = Atom \setminus (\{head(R) \mid R \in \mathcal{R}\} \cup \{head(E) \mid E \in \mathcal{E}\})$
- $AbsenceAttack = \{(ab(B), B) \mid B \in Absence\}$
- $AR = Atom \cup \{\text{ex}(H) \mid H \in Existence\} \cup \{ab(B) \mid B \in Absence\}$
- $ATT = Exc \cup AbsenceAttack$
- $SUP = Rule \cup ExistenceSupport$

The following theorem indicates that the semantics is preserved during transformation [11].

**Theorem 2.** For PROLEG program  $P$ , let  $M$  be an answer set of  $P$ . Assume that  $\mathcal{L}$  is the complete labeling of the BAF transformed from  $P$ . Then, for each atom  $H$  in  $P$ ,  $H \in M$  iff  $\mathcal{L}(H) = in$ .

*Example 5.* The program in Example 1 is transformed into the following BAF:  
 $\langle \{p, q_1, q_2, r, \text{ex}(q_2), \text{ex}(r)\}, \{(r, q_1)\}, \{(\{q_1, q_2\}, p), (\{\text{ex}(q_2)\}, q_2), (\{\text{ex}(r)\}, r)\} \rangle$ .

Complete labeling of the BAF is performed in the following manner. Arguments  $q_1$  and  $q_2$  together support argument  $p$ . The existence arguments  $\text{ex}(q_2)$  and  $\text{ex}(r)$  are added to support  $q_2$  and  $r$ , respectively. Figure 4 shows a graphical representation of the BAF, with the complete labeling<sup>2</sup>. As  $\mathcal{L}(q_1) = out$  and  $\mathcal{L}(q_2) = in$ , the label of the set of arguments  $\mathcal{L}(\{q_1, q_2\}) = out$ . Also, as  $p$  is supported by  $\{q_1, q_2\}$ ,  $\mathcal{L}(p) = out$ . When we ignore the existence and absence arguments introduced during transformation, the set of arguments labeled *in* is  $\{q_2, r\}$ , which coincides with the answer set of the program in Example 1.

## 5 Reasoning by the BAF

We describe the two types of reasoning performed by the BAF transformed from the PROLEG program:

1. Clarification of the entire structure of judgment and the causality in the arguments.
2. Identification of the required evidence.

<sup>2</sup> Note that, in the following figures, we omit the dotted rectangle over existence arguments to avoid making a figure messy.




Fig. 4. BAF for the program in Example 1.

### 5.1 PROLEG program

*Example 6.* Consider the following PROLEG program. The first set of a defining rule and an exception states that if the object is a human (not a dead body) and there exists both the action of murder and the intention to murder, then the crime of murder has been committed unless there was a legitimate defense. The second set of a defining rule and an exception states that if the accused is infringed and takes emergent, necessary, and appropriate action to defend himself/herself, then this is a legitimate defense, unless there was no aggressive intention to harm the deceased. The remainder of the program deals with the facts in evidence.

```
% rules regarding crime_of_murder
crime_of_murder <= human, act_of_murder, intention_to_murder.
exception(crime_of_murder, legitimate_defense).

legitimate_defense <=
    infringement, emergency, necessity, appropriateness,
    defense_intention.
exception(legitimate_defense, aggressive_intention_to_harm).

% facts
human <=.
act_of_murder <=.
intention_to_murder <=.
infringement <=.
emergency <=.
necessity <=.
appropriateness <=.
defense_intention <=.
```



## 5.2 Clarification of the entire structure of judgment and causality in the arguments

In this case, the entire PROLEG program is transformed into a BAF using the rules shown in Section 4.

For each atom, rules that define it and the exceptions are transformed into the BAF. If there exists a fact, then a corresponding existence argument supporting the fact is added. If an atom does not appear in the header of any rule or exception, then a corresponding absence argument attacking the atom is added to the transformed BAF. We show a graphical representation of the transformed BAF in Figure 5.




Fig. 5. Graphical representation of a transformed BAF for a murder case.

This BAF was obtained from an entire PROLEG program including facts, and shows the structure of the entire argumentation from which we can grasp the cause-and-effect relationships of the arguments.

Using this BAF, the argumentation process is explained as follows. As the label of the absence argument `ab(aggressive_intention_to_harm)` is *in*, that of the argument `aggressive_intention_to_harm` is *out* (there was no intention to harm). Therefore, the label of the argument `legitimate_defence` is *in* (it is a legitimate defense). The argument `crime_of_murder` has one attacking argument, the label of which is *in*, and one supporting set of arguments, the label of which is *in*. Hence, the label of the argument `crime_of_murder` is *out* (the crime of murder was not committed).

The BAF is updated as the judgment proceeds. Counter-arguments and evidences may be incrementally added as the corresponding nodes. Then, the node

labels can be changed. For example, if there is another exception to a `legitimate_defense` argument, and this is proven, a new argument is added; `legitimate_defense` is attacked by this argument and its label is changed to *out*. As another example, if evidence of `aggressive_intention_to_harm` is given, then its absence argument is replaced by an existence argument, and attack by the absence argument is replaced by support from the existence argument. As a result, the label of the node `aggressive_intention_to_harm` is changed to *in*. It follows that the label of `legitimate_defense` is changed to *out*, and that of the `crime_of_murder` to *in*.

### 5.3 Identification of required evidence

The BAF also identifies the evidence required to apply the law or prevent its application.

We transform a PROLEG program except for the fact part, and determine the existence arguments required to apply or not apply the law. Unlike the first type of reasoning, all available defining rules and exceptions are assumed to be represented, and no defining rules or exceptions are added.

From the definition of complete labeling,  $\mathcal{L}(A) = in$  holds iff the labels of all arguments that attack  $A$  are *out* and there exists an argument that supports  $A$ , of which the label is *in*, or  $A$  is neither attacked nor supported.

Assume that a plaintiff wants to apply a law or that a defendant wants to prevent its application. Then they seek to label the corresponding argument *in* and *out*, respectively. The BAF detects the evidence required for attainment of their goals, respectively. This is achieved by repeatedly applying the following process:

Let  $A$  be an argument.

- Make  $\mathcal{L}(A) = in$ .

Both of the following conditions should be satisfied.

- (attack condition) Make  $\mathcal{L}(B) = out$  for each  $B$  such that  $\text{att}(B, A)$ . If there does not exist such an argument  $B$ , then the condition is satisfied.
- (support condition) Make  $\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{A}) = in$  for some  $\mathbf{A}$  such that  $\text{sup}(\mathbf{A}, A)$ , that is, for each  $A' \in \mathbf{A}$ ,  $\mathcal{L}(A') = in$ . If there does not exist such  $\mathbf{A}$ , then an existence argument  $ex(A)$  and a support  $\text{sup}(\{ex(A)\}, A)$  should be added.


- Make  $\mathcal{L}(A) = out$ .

Either of the following conditions should be satisfied.

- (attack condition) Make  $\mathcal{L}(B) = in$  for some  $B$  such that  $\text{att}(B, A)$ . If there does not exist such an argument  $B$ , then this condition is not satisfied.
- (support condition) Make  $\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{A}) = out$  for each  $\mathbf{A}$  such that  $\text{sup}(\mathbf{A}, A)$ , that is, for some  $A' \in \mathbf{A}$ ,  $\mathcal{L}(A') = out$ . If there does not exist such  $\mathbf{A}$ , then this condition is not satisfied.

As a result, a set of existence arguments, that is, a set of evidences that should be provided, is found; this allows either party to attain his/her goal no matter what evidence his/her opponent offers.

*Example 7.* Figure 6 shows a BAF transformed from the PROLEG program excluding the fact part of Example 6. For convenience, each node is named  $a, b, \dots, k$ , respectively.



**Fig. 6.** Reasoning about required evidences.

- In this BAF, consider the conditions required to make  $\mathcal{L}(a) = in$ .
  - By attack condition for  $a$ ,  $\mathcal{L}(e) = out$  should be satisfied. To achieve this, attack condition for  $e$  or support condition for  $e$  should be satisfied. By attack condition for  $e$ ,  $\mathcal{L}(k) = in$  should be satisfied, and since  $k$  has no support,  $ex(k)$  is required. By support condition for  $e$ , at least one of  $\mathcal{L}(f) = out$ ,  $\mathcal{L}(g) = out$ ,  $\mathcal{L}(h) = out$ ,  $\mathcal{L}(i) = out$  or  $\mathcal{L}(j) = out$  holds. However, this is impossible since  $f, g, h, i$  and  $j$  are neither attacked nor supported.
  - By support condition for  $a$ ,  $\mathcal{L}(b) = \mathcal{L}(c) = \mathcal{L}(d) = in$  should be satisfied. To achieve this,  $ex(b), ex(c)$  and  $ex(d)$  are required.
 As a result, the plaintiff should provide the four evidences  $ex(k), ex(b), ex(c)$  and  $ex(d)$  to apply the law.
- On the other hand, consider the conditions required to make  $\mathcal{L}(a) = out$ .
  - By attack condition for  $a$ ,  $\mathcal{L}(e) = in$  should be satisfied. To achieve this,  $\mathcal{L}(k) = out$  should be satisfied, but this is impossible since  $k$  is neither attacked nor supported.

- By support condition for  $a$ , either  $\mathcal{L}(b)$ ,  $\mathcal{L}(c)$  or  $\mathcal{L}(d)$  should be *out*, but this is impossible since  $b, c$  and  $d$  are neither attacked nor supported. Therefore, the defendant never prevents application of the law.

In this example, only one set of existence arguments is found to make  $\mathcal{L}(a) = in$ , and no argument is found to make  $\mathcal{L}(a) = out$ . However, in general, we may find multiple sets in both cases. For example, assume that a plaintiff wishes to make  $\mathcal{L}(a) = in$  in the BAF shown in Figure 7. The evidence required to make  $\mathcal{L}(a) = in$  is one of  $ex(b)$  or  $ex(c)$ . The evidence required to make  $\mathcal{L}(f) = in$  is one of  $ex(g)$  or  $ex(h)$ . Thus, we find four sets of required evidences.




Fig. 7. Multiple sets of evidences are obtained.

## 6 Application of Reasoning

Here, we discuss how lawyers use the reasoning shown in subsection 5.3 in actual cases.

Consider an example regarding the Japanese civil code. This is a modified version of the house lease example discussed by Satoh et al. [17].

Assume that a plaintiff and a defendant have entered into a lease contract on a house. The defendant subleased a room of the house to his sister, who used the room, and the plaintiff claimed that the contract was ended by this sublease. The defendant claimed that he subleased the room for only ten days, which does not constitute abuse; however, the plaintiff argued that the neighbors complained that the sublessee played the piano, generating noise, which constituted an abuse.

The PROLEG program for this example, excluding the fact part is as follows. The first part shows that cancellation due to the sublease is effective if there was a lease contract and the house was handed over by the lessor to the lessee, there was a sublease contract and the room was handed over by the lessee to

the sublessee, the sublessee used the leased item, and the lessor manifested the intention of cancelling the lease contract; however, this is effective unless the lessor granted approval for the sublease and there was no abuse of confidence. The second part shows that the lessee is considered to have obtained approval for the sublease if the lessor granted approval of the sublease before cancellation. The third part shows that there is no abuse of confidence if there is a fact supporting non-abuse unless there is an abuse of confidence. The last part shows that there is an abuse of confidence if there is a fact supporting abuse.

```
% rules regarding lease

cancellation_due_to_sublease <=
    agreement_of_lease_contract, handover_to_lessee,
    agreement_of_sublease_contract, handover_to_sublessee,
    using_leased_thing, manifestation_cancellation.
exception(cancellation_due_to_sublease,get_approval_of_sublease).
exception(cancellation_due_to_sublease,nonabuse_of_confidence).

get_approval_of_sublease <=
    approval_of_sublease, approval_before_cancellation.

nonabuse_of_confidence <= fact_of_nonabuse_of_confidence.
exception(nonabuse_of_confidence,abuse_of_confidence).

abuse_of_confidence <= fact_of_abuse_of_confidence.
```

Figure 8 shows a BAF transformed from the PROLEG program. For convenience, the nodes are named  $a, a1, \dots, a6, b, c, d, \dots, h$ , respectively.

We identified the evidences that are required for this BAF to enable the plaintiff and the defendant to achieve their respective goals using the reasoning proposed in the previous section. As a result, it is impossible for the plaintiff to make the label of  $a$  to *in*. Therefore, there is no way for the plaintiff to win by applying the law, depending on the defendant's behaviors. On the other hand, the defendant should provide evidences  $ex(c)$  and  $ex(d)$  to make the label of  $a$  to *out*. Then, it is possible to prevent application of the law, regardless of the evidences provided by the plaintiff.

In this case, what can the plaintiff do? Is there no way to achieve his/her goal? One solution is to scrutinize the evidences required for the defendant, that is,  $ex(c)$  and  $ex(d)$ . Is it possible for the defendant (the lessee) to provide evidences for  $c$  and  $d$ , that is, `approval_of_sublease` and `approval_before_cancellation`? Mechanically, it is impossible to make either of the labels  $c$  and  $d$  to *out* if the defendant provided evidences for these nodes. But actually, these two approvals must be granted by the lessor, and the defendant may not give such evidences.

Assume that evidences for  $c$  and  $d$  are not provided. By applying the reasoning process again, the plaintiff would find that the evidences for  $a1, \dots, a6$  and  $h$  would be required to achieve his/her goal. If he/she were able to present




Fig. 8. BAF for a house-lease case.

these evidences, the defendant would not be able to prevent application of the law. Therefore, he/she will prepare these evidences. This example shows that, even if mechanical reasoning based on the BAF structure yields a solution of “impossible,” it is not always impossible actually.

The reasoning proposed for the BAF supports the plaintiff’s/defendant’s ability to achieve his/her goals by producing the required evidences. Additionally, it helps them to check the possibility of presenting evidences that would be disadvantageous to their case and suggests the behaviors that would be to their advantage.

## 7 Related Works

Several works on BAF semantics have been undertaken. In almost all of them, the BAFs are given in advance or obtained by a translation from artificial logic programs. Such programs principally discuss argumentation structures that are seldom seen in actual judgments. On the other hand, we sought to apply real-world legal reasoning. A significant issue during transformation is to give BAF semantics preserving legal reasoning; no previous BAF semantics met this criterion.

Cayrol et al. investigated BAF semantics, defining several types of indirect attacks by combining attacks with supports. They also defined several types of extension [6]. Next, the concept of “coalition” (a set of arguments) was introduced and used to define a meta-AF [7, 8]. The idea was to reduce a BAF to an AF by deleting the support relations between arguments in the same coalition. An argument in BAF is accepted if it is included in an accepted coalition of

the meta-AF. Boella et al. pointed out that this approach does not allow use of the Dung semantics, and revised the semantics by introducing different meta-arguments and meta-supports [2]. However, if we adopt these semantics, the semantics of PROLEG and BAF do not coincide [11]. It follows that we cannot combine arguments to form a single support without considering their original relationships in PROLEG.

Noueioua et al. proposed a BAF that considered a support relation to be a “necessity” relation [12]. In this approach, each atom corresponds to each argument, similar to our approach. They proved the correspondence between a normal logic program and their BAF. The main drawback of the method is that it does not discriminate support by a set of arguments from support given by separate multiple arguments. They do not reflect the case in which a set of body goals support its head goal in a logic program.

Oren and Norman developed an evidence-based argumentation by introducing a special unique argument, corresponding to an environment, into a BAF [13]. The introduction of such a special argument is similar to that of existence and absence arguments in our method. The difference is that we add an existence or absence argument for each fact and add a support/an attack from each existence/absence argument, respectively, so that our BAF should keep a PROLEG structure.

Unlike the works cited above, Brewka et al. developed an abstract dialectical framework (ADF) as a generalization of the Dung AF [3, 4]. In the ADF, each node is associated with an acceptance condition depending on the parent nodes, and each link exhibits an individual strength. A bipolar ADF is a subclass of ADF in which a link is either attacked or supported depending on the polarity of its strength. A BAF transformed from PROLEG may be considered to be an instantiation of an ADF. It would be interesting to explore whether an ADF semantics could be simply applied to a BAF transformed from PROLEG.

## 8 Conclusion

We have described the transformation from a PROLEG description to a BAF, and the legal reasoning using the BAF. We gave semantics to the BAF preserving the features of a PROLEG program. The BAF reflects the structure of the judgment process and causality among arguments. We have developed reasoning on the BAF, that is difficult to emulate or understand using a PROLEG program or execution trace. Our system will help lawyers and law school students to analyze judgments.

In future, we will improve reasoning by the BAF and create a graphical interface. We are also considering the combination of our reasoning method and existing causal reasoning, and we will compare our method with the existing reasoning scheme such as Abductive Logic Programming.

## Acknowledgment

This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP17H06103.

## References

1. Bench-Capon, T., Prakken H. and Sartor, G.: Argumentation in legal reasoning. *Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence*, 363-382 (2009).
2. Boella, G., Gabbay, D. M., Torre, L. van der and Villata, S.: Support in abstract argumentation In *Proc. of COMMA2010*, 40-51 (2010).
3. Brewka, G. and Woltran, S.: Abstract dialectical frameworks. In *Proc. of KR2010*, 102-111 (2010).
4. Brewka, G., Ellmauthaler, S., Strass, H., Wallner, J.P. and Woltran, S.: Abstract dialectical frameworks revisited. In *Proc. of IJCAI2013*, 803-809 (2013).
5. Caminada, M.: On the issue of reinstatement in argumentation. In *Proc. of JELIA2006*, 111-123 (2006).
6. Cayrol, C. and Lagasque-Schiex, M.: On the acceptability of arguments in bipolar argumentation frameworks. In *Proc. of ECSQARU2005*, 378-389 (2005).
7. Cayrol, C. and Lagasque-Schiex, M.: Coalitions of arguments: A tool for handling bipolar argumentation frameworks. In *International Journal of Intelligent Systems*, Volume 25, 83-109 (2010).
8. Cayrol, C. and Lagasque-Schiex, M.: Bipolarity in argumentation graphs: Towards a better understanding. *International Journal of Approximate Reasoning*, Volume 54, 876-899 (2013).
9. Dung, P. M.: On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in non-monotonic reasoning, logic programming and n-person games. *Artificial Intelligence*, Volume 77, 321-357 (1995).
10. Gelfond, M. and Lifschitz, V.: The stable model semantics for logic programming. In *Proc. of ICLP*, 1070-1080 (1988).
11. Kawasaki, T., Moriguchi, S. and Takahashi, K.: Transformation from PROLEG to a bipolar argumentation framework. In *Proc. of SAFA2018*, 36-47 (2018).
12. Nouioua, F. and Risch, V.: Argumentation framework with necessities. In *Proc. of SUM2011*, 163-176 (2011).
13. Oren, N. and Norman, T. J.: Semantics for evidence-based argumentation. In *Proc. of COMMA2008*, 276-284 (2008).
14. Prakken, H., Reed, C. and Walton, D.: Dialogues about the burden of proof. In *Proc. of ICAIL2005*, 115-124 (2005).
15. Rahwan, I. and Simari, G.(eds.): *Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence*, Springer (2009).
16. Reed, C. and Rowe, G.: Araucaria: Software for argument analysis, diagramming and representation. In *International Journal of AI Tools*, Volume 13, 961-980 (2004).
17. Satoh, K. et al.: PROLEG: An Implementation of the Presupposed Ultimate Fact Theory of Japanese Civil Code by PROLOG Technology. In *JSAI-isAI 2010: New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence*, 153-164 (2010).
18. Satoh, K. et al.: On generality of PROLEG knowledge representation. In *Proc. of JURISIN2012*, 115-128 (2012).